Child Exploitation
Most people have no idea how large the problem truly is.
US POLICY
Problems with Current U.S. Policy
Key Problems
The U.S. lacks any clear policy direction on a comprehensive program to combat the use of
child labor in the global economy. President Clinton's call for "voluntary" codes of conduct
to get companies to stop exploitative practices is either naive or cynical.
The Clinton administration espouses trade agreements that regard boycotts and labeling
programs as unduly restricting international trade.
A fundamental aspect of any forward-looking policy is that child workers need quality
education programs that provide them with skills for the future. The U.S. government has
yet to formulate an effective, coherent, and consistent policy with regard to child labor in
the global economy. The administration has complied with congressional mandates to
conduct comprehensive studies of the use of child labor in the global economy, and these
have produced some extremely thorough and useful reports by the Department of Labor.
Yet none of the reports have led to firm policy objectives. The administration has publicly
encouraged companies to abide by "voluntary" codes of conduct. But asking companies
that have benefited from the use of exploited child labor to suddenly become guardians of
higher standards is either naive or cynical.
The new legislation prohibiting the importation of products made by forced or indentured
child labor must be implemented by the U.S. Customs Service, under the Department of the
Treasury. What remains to be seen is whether the administration will enforce the law and
devote the necessary resources to developing a more comprehensive and effective overall
policy on child labor in the global economy.
The lack of a clear U.S. policy is more problematic than mere indecisiveness or
deliberation. Trade agreements negotiated and signed by the Clinton administration
effectively preclude the U.S. from dealing effectively with extreme worker rights violations,
including the pervasive use of child labor. For example, the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), now enforced by the World Trade Organization (WTO), would
presumably prohibit the U.S. from the importation of products made by child labor.
The WTO does not allow for social sanctions, which could be classified as impermissible
"technical barriers to trade." Likewise, even labeling schemes like RUGMARK might run
afoul of GATT provisions and could be considered technical barriers to trade. The
separate WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (AGP) would limit options for any
comprehensive selective purchasing requirement that prohibits the U.S. government from
purchasing goods made with child labor.
Membership in the WTO technically precludes the U.S. government from combating child
labor by developing options that might be inconsistent with specific obligations in existing
trade agreements. In the short run, the administration has been circumspect in commenting
on whether selective purchasing or voluntary labeling programs like RUGMARK would
violate WTO constraints. Clearly, the administration is loathe to make a public issue out of
the broad reach of the WTO, particularly when the president is involved in the sensitive
process of seeking "fast track" authority to negotiate new trade agreements.
Proponents of RUGMARK and selective purchasing on the local level would welcome a
WTO challenge to their efforts. Now that legislation is in place banning the importation of
products made with child labor, such a challenge will hopefully provoke an appropriate
discussion of the reach of the WTO in preventing sovereign nations from regulating social
issues as they relate to trade. Although there may indeed be room to debate the extent to
which trade rules should be the exclusive means to deal with social issues in the global
economy, few would deny that all reasonable efforts should be made to eradicate the use
of exploitative child labor.
The child labor issue should drive the larger struggle to regulate fundamental rights in the
global economy. As nations lose their sovereign rights to prohibit child labor (through
stealth provisions in complex trade agreements), there must be a plan to ensure that the
global economy does not force countries with reasonable child labor prohibitions to scrap
those protections and offer up their children as a source of extra cheap labor in order to
compete in the global marketplace. Should Washington find itself in the position of seeking
to dismantle child labor prohibitions in order to comply with WTO rules, the U.S. will forever
forfeit any credibility to its claim that free trade is in the interests of people at the lower end
of the global economic spectrum.
Another basic problem with U.S. policy is the lack of clear priorities in its development
thrust. As the RUGMARK program illustrates, a key aspect of any child labor policy is to
ensure that child workers are taken out of factories and placed in education programs that
will provide them with skills for the future.
The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID), the primary U.S. government agency
charged with development issues, is still struggling to find its place in the post-cold war
world. Much of its past was spent funding programs in developing countries to preempt the
spread of communist movements. Now, after a major reorganization, it is funding a range of
programs--from helping women achieve a voice in governance to promoting democracy in
general--but precious little is devoted to basic education and other support for children who
are at risk of being put to work.
The basic education of children does not seem to fit into any of the anagrams that AID has
devised. Unfortunately, desperate, poor, illiterate children do not have a strong lobby in
Washington. If the U.S. wishes to have a credible voice in efforts to stop child labor, it is
essential that it support its rhetoric with significant resources. Such a commitment would
demonstrate that the U.S. is motivated by a genuine concern for working children and their
future development prospects rather than by an economic desire to eliminate the
cheap-labor competitive advantage they provide.